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THE INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURE FOR CRIMINAL
TAX EVASION
JOSEPH H. MURPHY*
N AUGUST 3, 1957, the Department of Justice reported a steady
increase in the number of convictions for criminal income tax eva-
sion.' Convictions in the first six months of 1957, either by trial or by
plea, totalled 495.2 Those for all of 1956 were fifty less than that
number.3
These statistics indicate that the tempo of criminal income tax prosecu-
tions is being stepped up. Projecting the first half of 1957 through the
year would bring the number of tax exasion convictions for 1957 to
nearly 1,000. This speaks well of the efficiency of the Department of
Justice in handling these complicated cases. It is eloquent evidence of
the success of the Treasury in tracking down tax evaders, especially
considering the chaff which must be eliminated before the wheat is ready
for penal leavening.
These figures also show that, more and more, the general practitioner
will be called upon to act as counsel to those caught in the Treasury's
criminal web. When so summoned, he will find himself confronted with
a situation unlike that facing counsel for the defense in most criminal
cases. Not only are investigative techniques considerably different, but
methods of prosecution and defense must be molded to meet the peculiar
aspects of a tax evasion case.
The underlying reasons for tax evasion-high tax rates, prosperity,
inflation and the larceny in the hearts of some citizens-have been rela-
tively constant for some years. The ways in which a taxpayer's defections
are revealed have changed little over the same period. It is an increase
in the number of persons making income tax investigations, an improve-
ment in their skills, and a streamlining of methods of investigation and
prosecution which account for the Government's success in this area.
This serves to indicate the problems with which counsel for the recreant
taxpayer must cope.
He will find, for example, that he is drawn into the case at an early
stage of the investigation, rather than following arrest or indictment,
customary in most criminal cases. This, of course, offers him an oppor-
tunity not necessarily to shape the course of the investigation, but per-
haps to convince the investigator that all is not what it appears on the
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surface and that logical explanations exist for what would otherwise seem
to be tax evasive measures.
Taxpayer's counsel will also realize the need for expert accounting
assistance to be brought in at the outset, albeit certain risks entailing
therefrom. Treasury tax investigators are, in the main, persons trained
in accounting and not in law. While it cannot be gainsaid that a criminal
investigation mandates a taxpayer to retain an attorney, the latter is
compelled, by the same token of protection, to seek the services of a
trained accountant.
Lastly, the trial of a criminal income tax evasion case will be found to
lack much of the luster of the customary criminal forum. Figures, charts,
complex business dealings and bookkeeping transactions will bulk large
in the Government's case. Inferences raised by them must be met, and
to meet them, a taxpayer's counsel is called upon to cull up the same
techniques he employed during investigation in addition to applying
forensic skills to their presentation.
It will be the purpose of this article to discuss the progress of a criminal
tax evasion case from start to finish, that is, from the time the taxpayer
first becomes cognizant that he is involved in a criminal case-when the
attorney should be called in-to its ultimate conclusion, either by way
of abandoning the investigation, dismissing the indictment or informa-
tion or pleading to it, or by a final disposition following trial. Along the
way an attempt will be made to show what may be expected of the
Treasury, the Department of Justice, and, perhaps more pertinent for
present purposes, counsel for the taxpayer.
REVELATION OF EVASION
When it comes to the revelation of tax evaders, virtually all roads lead
to Rome. An economic avenue is the so-called "Informer's Reward,"
provided by section 7263 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. Under
this, the Treasury pays for information leading to the discovery of tax
evaders and the recovery of taxes. The amount of the reward is limited
to the annual appropriation for it and it is distributed to informers in the
discretion of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Details for obtain-
ing the reward are set forth in Treasury Decision 5770.4 At one time
the top reward paid was ten per cent of the recovery.5
However, monetary gain is by no means the only reason for informing
on tax evaders. Neighborhood rivalries, business competition, disgruntled
4. 1950-1 Cum. Bull. 126.
5. Special Ruling of The Bureau of Internal Revenue, January 11, 1923. For an in-
teresting decision involving the taxability of an informer's reward and the mechanics of
the award procedure, see Elmer J. Faul, 29 T.C. No. 49 (Dec. 22, 1957).
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employees and matrimonial difficulties6 are but a few of the other induce-
ments to inform. Informers are sufficiently numerous that many local
directors' offices have personnel who spend their full time screening these
revelations.
Tax evasion is also uncovered by alert Treasury agents who keep a
watchful eye on newspaper stories indicating the existence of large cash
hoards. They also keep track of large cash transactions in real estate
on the public records and, in some instances, through banks. A check
against the tax return of the persons involved indicates their ability to
accumulate the cash in question.
Probably the greatest number of leads to tax evaders comes through
routine investigations by the revenue agents.' For example, it is under-
stood that an audit of a corporation now results in an audit of its officers,
particularly in the close corporation field. Likewise, travel and entertain-
ment deductions are being carefully combed. These are but illustrations.
However, where fraud is suspected, the intelligence agents are called in
and the stage is set for a tax evasion investigation.
THE STATUTES
From the standpoint of taxpayer's counsel, presumably called in by his
client at the start of the investigation when the ultimate offense to be
charged may be undetermined, a familiarity with the statutory sources
of the potential charges is vital. There are a number of criminal offenses
against the income tax laws, punishable in varying degrees of severity.
Section 7201 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code provides:
"Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed
by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law,
be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000,
or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution."
Other offenses against the tax laws are also specified in chapter 75 of the
Code. They include felony penalties for willfully failing to collect or
6. See United States v. Ashby, 245 F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1957) where an estranged wife
turned all of a taxpayer's records over to the Treasury and he was indicted. His motion
to suppress was denied because (1) no confidential communication was involved, and (2)
the Treasury could use purloined evidence as long as it did not do the purloining.
7. Section 7601(a) of the Code requires the Treasury to "proceed" through each In-
ternal Revenue District and "inquire" concerning persons who may be liable for internal
revenue taxes. This, of course, is a blanket provision authorizing general "snooping" with-
out reference to any particular case.
Section 7602 directs specific attention to taxpayers under investigation. It authorizes the
Treasury to examine their books and records, to summon witnesses to produce papers and
to take testimony under oath. Summonses are authorized by § 7603, and § 7604 empowers
district courts to enforce them by their processes, including civil contempt penalties. In
addition to contempt, § 7210 provides that failure to comply with a summons may subject
the miscreant to a $1,000 fine and a year's imprisonment.
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pay a tax due and for issuing false and fraudulent statements to the
Treasury. Misdemeanor penalties are provided for failing to file returns,
supply information or pay estimated taxes.'0
Section 7201 is the statute under which most investigations are made
and under which most indictments are sought and obtained. This is
probably because a felony conviction is a better reward for a long and
tedious investigation and trial than a mere misdemeanor conviction.
Furthermore, the deterrent effect of a felony threat is undoubtedly
greater from the standpoint of the self-assessment features of the income
tax law. This conclusion is supported by the fact that, under the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939, the bulk of the prosecutions was brought under
the predecessor of section 7201.11
For a time there was some doubt as to whether a prosecution under
section 145 (b) of the 1939 Code," providing felony penalties, might not
also be the basis for a sentence under section 3616 (a) of the 1939 Code, 3
which provided lesser penalties for submitting false returns.'4 Under the
1939 Code, however, this question was resolved by a decision that section
145(b) and its predecessors impliedly repealed section 3616(a) as to
income tax matters and that the latter had no application thereto. 5
Section 7207 of the 1954 Code further eliminated the doubt when, in
re-enacting 1939 Code section 3616(a), it omitted the words "with intent
to evade or defeat," which caused the overlap with section 145(b). 1 It
would seem, therefore, that any criminal prosecution brought under
section 7201 will not be jeopardized by a claim that a lesser penalty is
in order under another section.
ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE
In tax evasion cases, the Government has the burden of proving the
crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.' Thus it must prove a willful
attempt in any manner to evade or defeat the tax or its payment.
It should be noted at the outset the offense is complete when the return
is filed 18 and there is no turning back, such as by the filing of an amended
8. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7202.
9. Id. § 7206.
10. Id. § 7203.
11. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 145(b), 53 Stat. 62.
12. Ibid.
13. 53 Stat. 440.
14. Berra v. United States, 351 U.S. 131 (1956).
15. Achilli v. United States, 353 U.S. 373 (1957); Costello v. United States, 352 U.S.
1028 (1957).
16. Achilli v. United States, 353 U.S. 373, 375 (1957).
17. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954).
18. Bowles v. United States, 73 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 710
(1935).
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return, which, rather than ameliorating the situation, may constitute an
admission. 9 This is because a fraudulent return is regarded as an attempt
to evade.2 ° So too, is uttering a false statement to a Treasury representa-
tive in the course of an investigation2' or willfully failing to pay the tax
shown to be due on a return that is filed.22
Underpayment of Tax
The Government must establish that there was a deficiency in taxes
for each of the prosecution years involved.23 In tax evasion cases, under-
payment is the corpus delicti which must be established, and there are
several ways in which the Government may meet this burden. The
easiest is to show an omission of specific items of income. However,
there are other methods of proof available in the absence of specific items
which, while more burdensome of investigation, are nevertheless effective.
Currently, the best known and most used of these indirect methods of
establishing tax deficiencies is the "net worth" method. The use of this
device involves establishing the total net value of a taxpayer's assets at
the beginning of a given year, proving an increase at the end of the year,
adding to the difference the non-deductible expenditures of the taxpayer,
and comparing the result with reported income. When non-income items
are eliminated, the difference is unreported income.24
19. United States v. Rosenblum, 176 F.2d 321 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 893
(1949) ; Cave v. United States, 159 F.2d 464 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 847 (1947) ;
Burr v. United States, 86 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 664 (1937) ; United
States v. McCormick, 67 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 662 (1934);
Emmich v. United States, 298 Fed. 5 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 608 (1924).
20. United States v. Troy, 293 U.S. 58 (1934); United States v. Rosenblum, 176 F.2d
321 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 893 (1949).
21. United States v. Beacon Brass Co., 344 U.S. 43 (1942) ; Cohen v. United States, 201
F.2d 386 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 951 (1953).
22. United States v. Palermo, 152 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Pa. 1957). This decision burst a
bubble for those who felt that filing a correct return, without payment of the tax, avoided
criminal penalties. It was made in the face of an argument based on the illegality of im-
prisonment for debt. See United States v. Miro, 60 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1932), where this
result may have been indicated.
23. Olender v. United States, 237 F.2d 859 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 982 (1956).
24. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954); Friedberg v. United States, 348
U.S. 142 (1954); Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954); United States v. Calderon,
348 U.S. 160 (1954). The Holland case said that, "increases in net worth, standing alone,
cannot be assumed to be attributable to currently taxable income. But proof of a likely
source, from which the jury could reasonably find that the net worth increases sprang is
sufficient." In United States v. Massei, 26 U.S.L. Week 4171 (U.S. March 3, 1958) it was
held that this is not to say that proof of a likely source is necessary in every case. On the
contrary, in establishing net worth there is no necessity for the government to prove a
likely source of income giving rise to the net worth provided it negatives all possible
sources of non-taxable income.
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Another device is the "bank-deposit" method, by which deposits to all
bank accounts are compared with reported gross income, 5 with other
appropriate adjustments. Still another indirect approach is to add claimed
deductions to non-deductible expenditures, compare the total with
reported income, and thus show either unreported income or falsified
deductions 2 6 Variations on this approach are the "living expense"
method, by which total living expenses plus savings are compared with
reported income,27 or a method by which total expenditures are added to
decreases in net worth and equated with reported income. Lastly, "the
percentage of mark-up" method applies a standard percentage of mark-up
to the sale of inventory items and compares it to the mark-up reported,
to prove that the difference is unreported income.
Willfulness
Having established the deficiency, the Government must further prove
that it was willfully incurred. The simplest way to achieve this is by
extrajudicial admissions or confessions which best serve to indicate the
taxpayer's mental state. These, of course, are admissible, subject to
their being corroborated by direct substantiation of the facts admitted
or by independent evidence, such as net worth or bank deposit computa-
tions, tending to show understatement of income for the prosecution
years. 0
Absent such admissions, however, the Government is not helpless. If it
proves an understatement of income by one of the methods described
above, with other corroborating facts as to the source of that income,
it has established its case, and it is up to the taxpayer defendant to offer
a reasonable explanation or remain silent at his peril. 0
The Supreme Court said of willfulness in 1933:31
"The word often denotes an act which is intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as
distinguished from accidental. But, when used in a criminal statute it generally means an
act done with a bad purpose ... ; without justifiable excuse ... ; stubbornly,
obstinately, perversely... The word is also employed to characterize a thing done
without ground for believing it is lawful . . . , or conduct marked by careless disregard
whether or not one has the right so to act ......
Ten years later, in the famous Spies32 case, after pointing out that
25. United States v. Frank, 245 F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1957); United States v. Venuto, 182
F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1950).
26. Zacher v. United States, 227 F.2d 219 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 993 (1955).
27. United States v. Irving, 241 F.2d 306 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 983 (1957).
28. United States v. Ford, 237 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1956).
29. Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954).
30. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954).
31. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933).
32. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 (1943).
19581
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"willful" was a word of many meanings, the construction of which was
frequently influenced by its context,3 3 the Court said:
.... By way of illustration, and not by way of limitation, we would think affirma-
tive willful attempt may be inferred from conduct such as keeping a double set of
books, making false entries or alterations, or false invoices or documents, destruction of
books or records, concealment of assets or covering up sources of income, handling of
one's affairs to avoid making the records usual in transactions of the kind, and any
conduct, the likely effect of which would be to mislead or to conceal."
'34
One of the most onerous obligations of a judge presiding over a
criminal tax case is instructing a jury on the question of willfulness. The
language of the foregoing cases has frequently been relied upon, par-
ticularly with reference to "bad purpose" as an element of willfulness.
Recently, however, there has been a noticeable tendency in the Ninth
Circuit to condemn an umbrella approach of this kind.35 There the
trend seems to require the court to associate the specific facts of the case
with an intent to evade or defeat the tax, the precise statutory language,
and to develop its charge on willfulness in this way rather than on the
basis of the generality, "bad purpose."3 8
THE TAXPAYER'S SAFEGUARDS
It may be seen from the statutory powers of investigation given the
Treasury37 that, with the exception of a rather bland provision designed
to prohibit repeated investigations without complying with certain for-
malities,3" the Treasury has been given plenary authority by statute to
obtain information. However unrestrained this authority may seem from
a statutory standpoint, it does have its constitutional and judicially-
imposed limitations.
Self-Incrimination
"Fifth amendment communists" have been the subject of wide
notoriety for several years; so too, have various types of racketeers. One
hears little, however, of fifth amendment tax evaders. Yet that constitu-
tional safeguard is as readily available to them as to others.
Without going into this matter in great detail, it should be pointed out
that the privilege against self-incrimination does not prevent a taxpayer
33. Id. at 497.
34. Id. at 499.
35. Forster v. United States, 237 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Herzog v. United States, 235
F.2d 664 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 844 (1956); Bloch v. United States, 221 F.2d
786 (9th Cir. 1955).
36. See Bloch v. United States, 221 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1955).
37. See note 7 supra.
38. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7605(b); Local 174, Teamsters Union, AFL v. United
States, 240 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1956).
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from being subpoenaed and compelled to appear before a grand jury.3 9
However, he may refuse to answer any incriminating questions put to
him.4 0
Whether he can claim the privilege with respect to his books and records
is less clear. There is some indication that the so-called "required
records" doctrine of Shapiro v. United States4 ' may apply to taxpayers,
42
although there are decisions indicating that the fifth' amendment would
cover the compulsory production of books and records.43
In other respects the use of the fifth amendment in tax investigation
follows the customary pattern. The privilege is personal to the taxpayer
and cannot be invoked by anyone on the taxpayer's behalf.44 It is not
available to corporations, nor to corporate officers claiming a privilege
based on withholding corporation information,45 although it is not entirely
clear that this is true with respect to closely-held corporations whose
officers are also the owners.46 The privilege against self-incrimination is
deemed waived unless asserted by the taxpayer at the first inquiry con-
cerning the subject matter of the privilege47 and it must be made in a
fashion which makes it clear that it is being asserted.
4 8
While the subject of taxpayer co-operation during investigation will
be discussed later, it should be pointed out here that the fifth amend-
ment must be kept in mind during the course of the investigation. It is
to be hoped that taxpayers are now urbane enough to retain an attorney
at the first blush of criminal investigation. While the better part of
wisdom is to keep the taxpayer and the investigating agent apart and let
the attorney do the talking, this is not always possible. However, there
is one rule which should never be broken. Whenever the occasion arises
that the special agent will be in contact with the taxpayer, counsel should
always be present.
The fifth amendment also raises the issue as to what is and is not
incriminating in a particular case. Of course, only a complete under-
standing of the case can resolve this problem. Therefore, it behooves
counsel to make an investigation of his client at least as searching as that
39. United States v. Mangiaracina, 92 F. Supp. 96 (WD. Mo. 1950).
40. Ibid.
41. 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
42. Beard v. United States, 222 F.2d 84 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955).
43. Blumberg v. United States, 222 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1955); In the Matter of Daniels,
140 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
44. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
45. Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457 (1913).
46. In the Matter of Daniels, 140 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
47. Nicola v. United States, 72 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1934).




being conducted by the Treasury. And in the early stages it should be
as impartial, because the taxpayer's counsel must see the case as it
appears to the special agent. After such an impartial investigation, gaps
can be filled in by personal contacts with the taxpayer, and if they are
not filled in, an area covered by the fifth amendment may be indicated.
Deception
Information obtained from taxpayers must be adduced voluntarily.
As with evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment, if facts
are obtained by fraud, duress, threats or promises of immunity they may
be suppressed.49 However, there is no obligation on the part of the
Treasury to warn a taxpayer that information he furnishes may form the
basis of subsequent criminal action against him."°
If a revenue agent, special or otherwise, obtains information voluntarily
upon request, without any representation as to its intended use, there is
no basis for suppressing it.51 It is evidently permissible for the agent to
describe his visit as a "routine audit," even though he is in fact on a
criminal mission.52 It is possible, however, for an agent to carry equivoca-
tion so far that it borders on affirmative deception, at which point the
courts may consider suppression.
5 3
The problem in this regard is one of taxpayer education. It can be
solved by an alert taxpayer requiring the agent to identify himself. If
he is a special agent, criminal investigation is indicated. If he is an
internal revenue agent, criminal investigation may perhaps be unlikely,
but the nature of his business should still be explored because revenue
agents and special agents frequently work in teams, and the former may
occasionally act as a decoy. In other words, if there is any likelihood of
any inquiries being a prelude to a criminal investigation, caution dictates
against blanket revelations.
49. White v. Uniteft States, 194 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 930 (1952).
50. Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303 (1912); Turner v. United States, 222 F.2d
926 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 831 (1955); Hanson v. United States, 186 F.2d 61
(8th Cir. 1950).
51. Turner v. United States, 222 F.2d 926 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 831 (1955)
Scanlon v. United States, 223 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1955) ; Blumberg v. United States, 222 F.2d
496 (5th Cir. 1955); Bateman v. United States, 212 F.2d 61 (9th Cir. 1954) ; Hanson v.
United States, 186 F.2d 61 (8th Cir. 1950) ; Moyer v. Brownell, 137 F. Supp. 594 (E.D.
Pa. 1956).
52. United States v. Frank, 245 F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1957) ; Montgomery v. United States,
203 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1953).
53. Hoffritz v. United States, 240 F.2d 109 (9th Cir. 1956); United States v. Wheeler,
149 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Pa. 1957); United States v. Wolrich, 119 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y.
1954), modified on rehearing, 129 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); United States v. Guerrina,
112 F. Supp. 126 (E.D. Pa. 1953), modified on rehearing, 126 F. Supp. 609 (E.D. Pa. 1955);




The attorney-client privilege is, of course, available in criminal tax
cases.54 However, it may not be employed to suppress matters which are
not properly the subject of the attorney-client relationship. 55 Thus, since
no accountant-client privilege is recognized in federal tax matters,5 6
accountant's papers in an attorney's hands are not privileged.5' This is
a harsh rule in the light of the necessity to obtain accounting services in
a criminal income tax investigation.58
It has been suggested that these rules might be circumscribed by
having the accountant employed, not by the taxpayer, but by the attorney
and there is some authority to support this.59 It has also been suggested
that the accountant's work sheets belong to the client and when in the
hands of his attorney, are covered by the taxpayer's privilege against
self-incrimination.60 While neither of these safeguards is bottomed on
unshakable authority,6 ' either should be availed of if the occasion arises,
because both are last resort remedies in any event. There are no other
present solutions to this problem.
THE INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS
In Washington, the Assistant Commissioner (Operations) has over-all
operational responsibility for tax evasion investigations.6" Functioning
under him, in Washington, is the Intelligence Division, composed of the
Intelligence Program Branch and the Intelligence Investigation Branch.
Neither branch conducts investigations. Their functions are basically
planning, training and coordinating.
In the Office of the Chief Counsel in Washington there is an Assistant
Chief Counsel (Enforcement), who has general supervision over the legal
phases of tax evasion, including maintaining a liaison with the Criminal
Section of the Tax Division of the Department of Justice. He also acts
as a mediator between Regional Counsel and- the Intelligence Division.
These functions are performed through the Enforcement Division, which
54. Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833
(1956).
55. Sale v. United States, 228 F.2d 682 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1006 (1956);
Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953).
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. United States v. Brodson, 241 F.2d 107 (7th Cir. 1957).
59. Lalance & Grosjean Mfg. Co. v. Haberman Mfg. Co., 87 Fed. 563 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1898).
60. In the Matter of House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
61. Gariepy v. United States, 189 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1951).
62. The material following this footnote is all taken from "Internal Revenue Service,
Organization and Functions," 21 Fed. Reg. 10418 (1956).
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has authority to make determinations in such tax evasion cases as are
referred to it.
At the field level of the Regional Commissioner, there is an Assistant
Regional Commissioner (Intelligence), who reviews reports submitted
by district special agents, makes recommendations and holds conferences.
The Office of the Regional Counsel handles enforcement matters by
reviewing recommendations, by preparing and referring cases to the
Department of Justice or, when authorized by the Department of Justice,
directly to the United States Attorney for the district involved. Regional
Counsel also assist the United States Attorneys in the presentation of
criminal cases.
At the field level of the District Director there is an Intelligence Divi-
sion, headed by a chief. To this division are assigned the special agents
who actively conduct the investigation of tax evaders. This division
makes recommendations as to the disposition of cases investigated.
Investigative technique
The Internal Revenue Service has an elaborate Statement of Procedural
Rules63 covering its entire operations. It provides a minutiae of detail
with respect to civil tax procedure. Its information with respect to the
criminal investigative process is understandably like an iceberg. Only
a very small portion of the whole is visible.
In the Statement, allusion is made to criminal penalties"4 and inform-
ants' rewards."5 It is pointed out, however, that ordinary audit procedures
do not apply in criminal cases, except where the criminal aspects are
closed and only the civil fraud penalty remains, 66 and even this cannot
be eliminated without the consent of Regional Counsel.67 It is also pointed
out that ordinary civil appellate procedures do not apply in any case in
which prosecution has been recommended until final disposition of that
phase of the case.6"
Under section 7122 of the 1954 Code the Commissioner may compro-
mise any civil or criminal case prior to its referral to the Department of
Justice. However, the Statement makes it clear that a criminal liability
63. 26 C.F.R. § 601 (1956).
64. Id. § 601.104(c) (4).
65. Id. § 601.104(c) (5).
66. Id. § 601.105(g).
67. Id. § 601.106(a) (2) (ii). Rather than require specific consent of the Regional Coun-
sel to the civil settlement of all cases which have been the subject of a special agent's
investigation, it is now possible for the special agent to withdraw from the case. Where
he does so, he can authorize the revenue agent to settle the case without exacting fraud
penalties.
68. Id. § 601.106(a)(2) (iii).
[Vol. 27
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will not be compromised unless it involves only regulatory provisions and
then only if it is not deliberate with intent to defeat a taxf 9
Skimpy as these rules are with respect to criminal procedures, they do
make several points clear. First, when criminal investigation is under-
taken, the revenue agent no longer controls the case. The special agent
is in charge. Secondly, the special agent or his counterpart along the line
will continue in charge until final disposition is made of the criminal
aspects of the case, and even then he may have the last word as to elimina-
tion of the civil penalties. Finally, no discussion or settlement of the
case either by way of an offer in compromise or a civil adjustment is
possible until disposition of its criminal features.
These rules point up a previously alluded to feature of criminal tax
cases which distinguishes them from most other fields of criminal law.
Most criminal cases come to an attorney after arrest and perhaps even
after indictment. However, if an attorney has a client in tax trouble, the
attorney may be in the case at the start of the investigation, since a tax-
payer has a right, not necessarily constitutional, to be represented by
an attorney during the course of an investigation.7" However, the
Treasury has been upheld in its policies of refusing to permit the tax-
payer's attorney to represent other witnesses questioned during the
investigation,' or to have his accountant 72 or transcribing secretary73
attend hearings.
The Investigation
Once the case has been assigned to the Intelligence Division of the
District Director's Office it will be turned over to a special agent. A
revenue agent of the Audit Section will be assigned to work with him.
If the case is not one arising de novo in the hands of the special agent,
the latter will, of course, familiarize himself with the material developed
by the revenue agent. He will also, in all probability, pull available data
on the taxpayer from the files. This would include, for example, prior
returns and any reports, adjustments and investigations which have been
conducted with respect to them. Having digested this material he is in
a position to commence his own investigation.
He and the revenue agent will then proceed to investigate the informa-
tion furnished to him and to run down leads indicated by the facts on
hand. They will undoubtedly make a thorough analysis of the bank
69. Id. § 601.203(a) (1), (2).
70. Administrative Procedure Act, § 6(a), 5 U.S.CA. § 1005(a) (Supp. 1950); Torras v.
Stradley, 103 F. Supp. 737 (NJ). Ga. 1952); United States v. Smith, 87 F. Supp. 293 (D.
Conn. 1949). For the constitutional rights involved, see Torras v. Stradley, supra.
71. United States v. Smith, supra note 70.
72. In re Lyons, 32 F. Supp. 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
73. Torras v. Stradley, 103 F. Supp. 737 (NfD. Ga. 1952).
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records of the taxpayer, first by requesting that they be turned over by
them and, failing in that, by going to the banks themselves. They will
also consult the various people with whom the taxpayer does business
as, for example, his brokers and his employer.
The tack that such an investigation will take is entirely fluid and
depends, of course, upon the kind of taxpayer under investigation. With
respect to doctors, for example, the special agent may request complete
hospital records on all patients treated, and then check with these patients
to ascertain what was paid by them.74 With attorneys, it is not uncommon
for revenue agents to send out mimeographed requests for information to
clients whose names have been discovered. Many of these requests for
information will be followed up personally by the agent who may, if he
chooses, take testimony under oath.
At none of these points of investigation will the agent necessarily be
in touch with the taxpayer. However, he may come to him from time to
time with requests for information. The agent may ask the taxpayer to
submit to a question and answer examination under oath, a transcript of
which will be later presented to the taxpayer for signature. On this score
it might be noted that transcripts are, as a matter of policy, generally not
turned over to the taxpayer or his attorney before signing. They must be
read in the presence of the special agent and executed or not as the case
may be, and if executed the taxpayer receives a copy.
This phase of the investigation is a one way street insofar as the tax-
payer is concerned. He is not being given any information as to the pur-
pose of the inquiry except for the general statement that his returns for
the years involved are being investigated. However, an astute attorney
can frequently ascertain, from the nature of the inquiries made, the type
of case the Government is seeking to develop. For example, inquiries
concerning particular transactions may indicate a specific item case,
whereas inquiries concerning the method of living or the location and
nature of various assets may indicate a net worth case or a living expendi-
tures case.
An investigation of this intensity is a time-consuming process, taking
two or perhaps even three years to complete. For this reason the statute
of limitations on criminal prosecution should be kept in mind, because
the chances are it may be some considerable time after the filing of the
return before it reaches the point where investigation is undertaken.
Section 6531(2) provides a six year limitation on prosecution for
willfully attempting in any manner to evade or defeat income taxes. The
period starts to run on the date the return is actually filed and not, as with
civil cases, on the last date the return could have been filed without
74. In re Albert Lindley Lee Memorial Hospital, 209 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1953).
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penalty.75 It expires on midnight of the day following the expiration of
six years from the date of filing.76 The time during which a taxpayer
under investigation is outside of the United States or is a fugitive from
justice tolls the statute of limitations. 77
An indictment against the taxpayer need not be returned nor need he
consent to the filing of an information against him within the statutory
period. It is sufficient if a complaint is instituted before a United States
Commissioner within such time, provided an indictment or information
is obtained within nine months thereafter. 78 A complaint must be based
upon personal knowledge, that is, it cannot be made by an Assistant
United States Attorney not familiar with the case but must be made by
the agent who looked into the facts. 79 However, hearsay evidence is
admissible.80
Following the completion of the investigation, the special agent, with
the assistance of the revenue agent working with him, who has meanwhile
been preparing the mathematical features of the case, will write his report.
A draft of this report may be submitted to the head of the local Intelli-
gence Unit. If the conclusion is not to recommend prosecution, a formal
report to this effect will be written and the taxpayer called in to discuss
civil settlement of his case.
If prosecution is to be recommended, the head of the Intelligence Unit,
reviewing the draft report of the special agent, may very well require it
to be tightened up perhaps by affidavits or documentary evidence not
already included. In some areas a draft report of this nature may be sub-
mitted to the office of the Assistant Regional Commissioner (Intelligence)
and perhaps to the Regional Enforcement Counsel for their recommenda-
tions as to the manner in which the report could be improved. It is then
returned to the special agent for preparation in final form.
After the preparation of the final report in which prosecution is recom-
mended the taxpayer will be afforded a conference. There he will be
handed a slip of paper showing the alleged understatement of income, to-
gether with taxes and penalties. It is believed that the general practice
at this conference is also to tell the taxpayer whether the alleged under-
statement is based upon specific items, net worth, or any of their
variations.
This is all the information he will obtain at this conference, for the
75. United States v. Ehrlich, 104 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
76. Burnet v. Willingham Loan & Trust Co., 282 U.S. 437 (1931); DeHardit v. United
States, 224 F.2d 673 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 863 (1955).
77. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6531.
78. Ibid.
79. United States v. Langsdale, 115 F. Supp. 489 (W.D. Mo. 1953); United States v.
Dolan, 113 F. Supp. 757 (D. Conn. 1953).
80. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
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Government is understandably reluctant to reveal its case where pros-
ecution is to be recommended. He will, however, be afforded an oppor-
tunity to submit any explanations he may have. This may be done via
affidavits or by submitting to a question and answer examination.
The taxpayer's situation at this point is not entirely hopeless. The
chances may be fair that his counsel, together with the accountant re-
tained to assist him during the investigation, will have some idea of the
Government's case. Having seen the amounts claimed due they may now
be in a position to pinpoint a defense by way of explanation, and if per-
suasive enough, the evidence adduced may change the opinion of the
special agent and his local chief.
The procedure followed by the investigating officers is to recommend
prosecution where the evidence is sufficient to indicate guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, and where there appears to be a reasonable probability
of conviction.8 Sinice this is the gauge for the Treasury recommendation,
it should be the focal point of defense efforts. Taxpayer's representatives
should attempt to raise an element of doubt, or failing that, show the
improbability of conviction in any event.
Assuming that the taxpayer has failed to induce the local Intelligence
Unit not to recommend prosecution, the file is then transmitted to the
Assistant Regional Commissioner (Intelligence). The report is reviewed
and endorsed or returned for civil settlement. It is believed that before
this recommendation becomes final the file in question is assigned to the
Office of Regional Counsel.
Upon transmission of the file from the local director's office to the
Regional Commissioner's Office, a letter is sent to the taxpayer advising
him of this action and informing him that he has a right to a conference
at the Regional Commissioner's level. If such a conference is requested,
it will be granted, providing the statute of limitations is not too rapidly
expiring. While some of the material referred to above indicates that
these conferences are held by staff members assigned to the Assistant
Regional Commissioner (Intelligence), most of these conferences are con-
ducted by a member of the staff of the Regional Counsel handling en-
forcement matters. At such a conference testimony may be taken under
oath and whatever further information desired, submitted.
It is not the usual practice of attorneys working in this field to make a
formal affair of this conference. Generally speaking, they have had ade-
quate opportunity to do this beforehand. These conferences consist, in
the main, in the taxpayer's attorney discussing in an informal way what
he thinks to be the weak points in the Government's case, his efforts
81. Subcommittee on Internal Revenue Taxation, Progress Report to Committee on
Ways and Means. 85th Cong., 2d Sess. Subdivision IX, (1) at 68 (1957).
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directed to obtaining a reconsideration of the case in the light of these
arguments. As a result of such a conference the file may be returned
again to the special agent for verification of certain facts which may have
been cast into doubt or for the checking of additional evidence.
With the whole report before him, the Assistant Regional Commis-
sioner (Intelligence) then decides whether to endorse the prosecution rec-
ommendation. If he does not, the file will be returned to the local District
Director's Office and a civil adjustment will be sought, the criminal phase
of the case being terminated. If he endorses the recommendation, the
general practice is to transmit the whole case directly to the Criminal
Section of the Tax Division of the Department of Justice. Occasionally,
it may be transmitted to the Enforcement Division in the Office of the
Chief Counsel for consideration there. Also, occasionally with the con-
sent of the Department of Justice, the file may be transmitted directly to
the United States Attorney for prosecution, although this step is usually
taken only where time limitations are pressing.
When and if the case is forwarded to the Criminal Division of the Tax
Section of the Department of Justice, the taxpayer is notified. Only upon
request will he be given an opportunity for another conference to be held
in Washington, this time by the Justice Department's attorney to whom
the case has been assigned. The technique at this level is roughly the
same as at the conference with the Regional Enforcement Counsel. Fol-
lowing this conference the Department of Justice decides either to return
the file to the Treasury, in which case a civil adjustment will be sought,
or to forward the file to the United States Attorney with instructions to
seek an indictment.
Co-operation
The most difficult decision to be made in handling a criminal income
tax case during the investigative period is the extent to which the tax-
payer should be permitted to co-operate with the investigating agents.
Quite obviously, nothing is to be gained by refusing to furnish informa-
tion which can be obtained elsewhere, such as bank and broker's state-
ments, and matters which are of public record. Not only does the furnish-
ing of this information make the task of the special agent somewhat less
arduous (with perhaps some psychological value) but it also may be a
method of keeping the facts of the investigation from becoming public
knowledge. It would seem that only most unusual circumstances would
dictate non-co-operation in this respect.
However, it is quite a different situation when the requested co-opera-
tion requires divulging information not otherwise obtainable and which
is safeguarded by the fifth amendment. This would include net worth
statements, and various types of affidavits and question and answer
statements which reveal facts peculiarly within the knowledge of the tax-
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payer. If the information submitted is true and incriminating, the tax-
payer may be hanging himself. If this is not true and its falsity is dis-
covered, this, of course, upon the assumption that the taxpayer's repre-
sentative believes it to be true, the penalties for issuing false statements
to the Government may perhaps be more severe than for the original
crime investigated.
Unfortunately, the decisions do not help much in this regard. They
indicate that failure to produce records for inspection by an agent is a
circumstance which may be pointed to by the court as bearing upon
willfulness,82 one of such cases indicating that this is not a violation of
the fifth amendment.8 3 On the other hand, the cases seem to be fairly
clear that the assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination would
preclude the court from drawing unfavorable inferences.84 Perhaps the
distinction lies between the taxpayer's insistence on keeping silent and his
refusal to produce books and records, for it is at least argumentative
that the latter may be covered by the "required records" doctrine and
not a proper subject of the privilege. 5
It would seem the better part of wisdom to refuse to disclose any in-
formation not otherwise obtainable, which would incriminate the tax-
payer and assist the Government in its case. While it is unlikely that the
Treasury at this point would care to test the applicability of the "required
records" doctrine to the taxpayer's situation, it might be better to put it
to this test rather than submit. This is an area, of course, in which each
case must be resolved upon its own facts and there is little help in
generalities.
IN THE COURTS
Theoretically, the United States Attorney has the final decision to
make with respect to the presentation of a case to a federal grand jury
and forcing its subsequent trial.86 In tax cases, however, a prosecution
recommendation to the United States Attorney is understood to be equi-
valent to a royal invitation. This being the case, about all there is to be
gained by conferring with the United States Attorney in advance of in-
dictment is to have him request further consideration of the case from
the Department of Justice.
82. Beard v. United States, 222 F.2d 84 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955);
Olson v. United States, 191 F.2d 985 (8th Cir. 1951) ; Myres v. United States, 174 F.2d 329
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 849 (1949); Paschen v. United States, 70 F.2d 491 (7th
Cir. 1934).
83. Myres v. United States, supra note 82.
84. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957) ; United States ex rel. Vajtauer v.
Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103 (1927) ; Healey v. United States, 186 F.2d 164
(9th Cir. 1950).
85. Beard v. United States, 222 F.2d 84 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955).
86. Goldberg v. Hoffman, 225 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1955).
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Neither the taxpayer nor his attorney may, as a matter of right, attend
the grand jury session at which the case is presented. Since an indict-
ment may be based on hearsay evidence, 17 the principal witnesses will be
the Treasury agents who made the investigation, with such others as may
be summoned. Since the case will probably be complicated and the wit-
nesses testifying expert, failure to indict in these cases is understandably
rare.
After indictment, the taxpayer is arraigned, posts bond, and prepares
to enter his plea. Generally speaking, a not guilty plea is entered first,
the taxpayer preserving his rights to move against the indictment at a
later date.
The type of motion to be made will, of course, depend on the nature
of the case. Some very unusual motions are made in tax cases. 88 How-
ever, the one most frequently made is for a bill of particulars, since the
taxpayer may still be very much in the dark as to the exact nature of the
charges.
Granting such a motion is discretionary with the court. s9 Some judges
have forced the Government to disclose the theory of its case and, if
based on specific items, the itemsf ° Others have refused to be as liberal.91
On an analogous score, inspection of grand jury minutes is rarely
permitted.
On the trial of the case, the Government's proof will consist basically
of the testimony of the agents who conducted the investigation. They are
entitled to testify from summaries prepared by them from the taxpayer's
records, even though such records are not themselves in evidence, pro-
vided the records are available for cross examination. 3 Charts are also
admissible to explain the agents' testimony.9 4
Where an agent is testifying from notes, the taxpayer is entitled to
examine them.9 5 The First Circuit held in 1955 that the taxpayer was
87. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
88. Goldberg v. Hoffman, 226 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1955), where on the basis of the de-
fendant's health, it was attempted to mandamus the judge to dismiss after conviction.
89. O'Connor v. United States, 175 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1949); Maxfield v. United States,
152 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 794 (1946); See Singer v. United
States, 58 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1932).
90. United States v. Pinto, 57-2 U.S.T.C. f 9943 (W.D. Mich. 1957); United States v.
Brodson, 132 F. Supp. 729 (E.D. Wis. 1955); United States v. Profaci, 124 F. Supp. 141
(E.D.N.Y. 1954); United States v. King, 54-2 U.S.T.C. fI 9655 (N.D.N.Y. 1954).
91. United States v. Klein, 124 F. Supp. 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
92. United States v. Profaci, 124 F. Supp. 141 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
93. Paschen v. United States, 70 F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1934) ; Cooper v. United States, 9
F.2d 216 (8th Cir. f925).
94. Smith v. United States, 236 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1956).
95. Montgomery v. United States, 203 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1953).
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not entitled to inspect the report of a witness contained in the Govern-
ment's files, in the absence of a showing that it was inconsistent with his
testimony 6 For a while, validity of this decision was cast into doubt
by the decision of the Supreme Court in the Jencks case," but the so-
called "F. B. I. Files Bill"-in reality of much broader import-has
modified the impact of Jencks, and probably vitiated its use in tax cases,9 8
this upon the assumption that the new law is constitutional.
Following conviction, the taxpayer is faced with a sentence of up to
five years on each count of the indictment or a fine of $10,000, or both. 9
The severity of the fine and sentence lies in the discretion of the trial
court. °° He may also be taxed with the costs of prosecution,'0 ' which
would include witness fees, etc.' While acquittal would obviate these
penalties, neither it nor conviction has any bearing upon the civil collec-
tion of the deficiency in taxes, interest and fraud penalties, which are re-
garded as entirely separate matters. 0 3
The foregoing indicates the wisdom of defense counsel in tax cases
giving serious thought to the entry of a plea of guilty, especially if it
would result in a relatively lower fine and a suspended sentence. It
should be understood that a plea, coupled with a satisfactory civil settle-
ment, frequently made a condition of the pre-sentence investigation, 10 4
will not, ipso facto, avoid a prison term. 0 5 However, since these are
discretionary matters with the trial court and tax trials are long, com-
plicated and costly, elements of this nature are bound to enter into
judicial consideration.
Alternative to either a plea of guilt or a trial, and hinging upon con-
sent of the court, is a plea of nolo contendere, which is a mere statement
of unwillingness to contest, generally carrying no criminal stigma. 06 In
96. Scanlon v. United States, 223 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1955); United States v. Palermo,
57-2 U.S.T.C. ff 9911 (SLD.N.Y. 1957).
97. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
98. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3500, 71 Stat. 595 (1957).
99. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7201.
100. Jolly v. United States, 229 F.2d 180 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 963 (1956),
where ten years' imprisonment and a $40,000 fine were termed unduly severe but not sub-
ject to being disturbed.
101. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7201.
102. Gleckman v. United States, 80 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 709
(1936); See United States v. Rosenblum, 182 F.2d 956 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
826 (1950).
103. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) ; Slick v. United States, 1 F.2d 897 (7th
Cir. 1924).
104. United States v. Steiner, 239 F.2d 660 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 936 (1957).
105. Burr v. United States, 86 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 664
(1937); United States v. La Fontaine, 54 F.2d 371 (D. Md. 1931).
106. Mickler v. Fahs, 243 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1957).
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effect, it amounts to a plea of guilt only in the case where made, 10 7 al-
though, in a civil case such a plea was held admissible in the Tax Court
for impeachment purposes. 08
Be that as it may, however, it is believed that most United States
attorneys are unwilling, in the run-of-the-mim criminal tax cases, to
accept a nolo contendere plea. District judges incline to go along. At the
present writing, it would appear very difficult to enter such a plea and
have it accepted.
CONCLUSION
As the writer has endeavored to indicate, criminal income tax cases
do not closely resemble other criminal matters. Mainly, this stems from
the fact that the taxpayer is aware of the investigation long before it
comes to fruition and is in a position to protect himself during its course.
Criminal tax cases may also differ from other criminal matters in that
quite frequently the taxpayer is "an otherwise respectable citizen" who
is experiencing his first brush with the law. The disastrous effects of a
wide-spread inquiry into his financial affairs, with perhaps the agent in-
dicating why the taxpayer is being investigated, must also be reckoned
with.
Therefore, the duties of counsel representing such a taxpayer are some-
what different from those of an attorney in an ordinary criminal case.
Because he is in at an early stage of the case, he may be in a position to
persuade the Treasury Department that the case should be relegated to
a purely civil settlement. Where he has a client who is having his first
experience on the criminal side of the law and to whom an indictment,
even though followed by a subsequent acquittal, would be socially and
economically calamitous, this is perhaps the greatest service he can
perform.
Along the same lines, by proper co-operation with the investigating
agents, counsel for the taxpayer may be able to prevent the investigation
from becoming public knowledge, with its unfortunate results. This he
may be able to do by making it unnecessary for the investigating agent
to go to the public records, to the banks, to the brokers, and to the tax-
payer's business associates for information. Since none of this would be
privileged, it is something the taxpayer himself could furnish without
having to reveal the reasons why he requests it.
All in all, then, the unusual service which can be performed in a crim-
inal tax case are performed at the investigative level. Following indict-
ment the case pursues the familiar federal criminal pattern with a few
of the ramifications alluded to above.
107. Ibid.
108. Kilpatrick v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1955).
